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I.

THE COMMISSION'S
OVERLY BROAD.

STATEMENT

OP

ISSUES

IS

P e t i t i o n e r , Morton International, Inc. ("Morton") does
not agree with the Statement of Issues set forth in Respondent's,
Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission"), Brief because i t is
overly broad and under inclusive.

Morton's Statement of Issues

set forth in i t s Brief specifically defines the issues before the
Court and should be followed,
II.

UNDER THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACTf
ISSUES AS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ARE
REVIEWED DE NOVO WITH NO DEFERENCE TO THE

COMMISSION'S PRIOR DECISION.
The C o m m i s s i o n ' s s t a t e m e n t of t h e s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w
t h i s case is incorrect.
established

principle

T h i s Court r e c e n t l y r e c o n f i r m e d t h e w e l l
that

issues

of

law a r e

t o be r e v i e w e d

novo w i t h no d e f e r e n c e g i v e n t o a lower c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n .
K e n n e c o t t Copper C o r p o r a t i o n v .
Rep. 3 , 4 ( O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1 9 9 0 ) .
held

1

that

the

in

interpretation

Salt

Lake C o u n t y ,

construction

E.g.,

145 Utah Adv.

This Court has l i k e w i s e
or

de

of

repeatedly
statutory

As stated by the Commission, the issues are whether the Commission corr e c t l y ruled in i t s favor and against Morton. While that statement of the
issues i s not incorrect, the Commission's statement i s not helpful to t h i s
Court. Specifically the issues are (1) whether the Commission should narrowly
define the statutory words "synthetic fuel" as a Hterm of art M or by the coomon and ordinary meaning of the words; and (2) whether "equipment" should be
defined according to a common understanding of how property actually funct i o n s , rather than how i t theoretically could operate.

language

is a legal

issue.

The "correction-of-error

a l s o a p p l i e s when the issue i s one of basic l e g i s l a t i v e
The Commission c o r r e c t l y notes that Section

standard
intent."
63-46b-16

(1988) applies to t h i s proceeding, and that a f i n a l determination
4
in t h i s matter must be made on the record.

However, the Commis-

s i o n i s wrong in arguing that t h i s Court must defer to the Commission's decision.

In Bevans v. Industrial Commission of Utah,

790 P.2d 573 (Utah 1990), applying post-Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPAM) law, t h i s Court confirmed i t s e a r l i e r d e c i sions

(applying

pre-UAPA law)

on the

appropriate

standard

of

review of an agency's interpretation or construction of a s t a t ute.
vant
relief

In Bevans, t h i s Court f i r s t noted that "[u]nder the r e l e portion

of

section

63-46b-16(4)(d)

(1989),

we can

grant

to Bevans if the agency 'erroneously interpreted' the law

to h i s s u b s t a n t i a l prejudice."

i d . at 575.

The Court continued

2

E.g., Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Commission of Utah, 791 P.2d 511, 513
(Utah 1990) ("questions of statutory construction are matters of law for the
courts, and we rely on a 'correction of error standard of review, according no
deference to an administrative agency's interpretation.'") (Emphasis added).
3

Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d
524, 527 (Utah 1988).
4

This Court recently remanded a proceeding back to the Commission because
of the Commission's failure to base i t s decision on the record. The Commission apparently believed i t had the authority and discretion to make findings
outside of the record. This Court rejected that notion stating Hthe Tax Commission [does not have] the unbridled discretioa to make findings of fact
beyond the scope of what i s presented in the hearings. . . .M First National
Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (October 16, 1990).
In this case the Commission's failure i s similar.
As
explained infra, the Commission disregarded the evidence presented at the
hearing to make inadequate and unsupported findings.
-2-

to explain what is the appropriate standard of review to determine if the agency "erroneously interpreted" the law:
[C]ourts generally give little deference to
the agency, with the result that a court may
decide that the agency has erroneously interpreted the law if the court merely disagrees
with the agency's interpretation.
Id,

(emphasis added) (citing the official comment to the identi-

cal provision in the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedures
Act).

The Court then concluded:
[U]nder section 63-46b-16(4)(d) of the
UAPA, it is still appropriate for a court to
review an agency's interpretation of its
statutorily granted powers and authority as a
question of law, with no deference to the
Agency's view of the law. We therefore apply
the correction of error standard to such an
issue and uphold the Commission's statutory
interpretation only if we conclude it is not
erroneous.

Id. at 576. (footnote omitted).
The facts

in this case are not disputed.

Instead,

the issues in this case are legal issues involving the proper
statutory construction or interpretation of Section 59-12-104(15)
and (16).

As this Court has repeatedly held, it should review

the record de novo, and reach its own conclusion as to the appropriate construction of the statute in question giving no deference
the

to

the

Commission's

Commission's
decision

prior

is

arbitrary

-3-

decision.
and

Moreover,

unsupported

by

s u b s t a n t i a l evidence when viewed in light of the whole record as
the Commission has s e l e c t i v e l y ignored the undisputed f a c t s .
For the reasons l a t e r explained herein and in Morton's
Brief, the Commission erroneously interpreted the relevant law,
and denied Morton's request for a refund of s u b s t a n t i a l amounts
in s a l e s taxes paid with respect to Morton's f a c i l i t i e s .

Morton

has been and is being deprived of i t s property as a r e s u l t of the
Commission's improper and unlawful decision.

Morton

therefore

has been " s u b s t a n t i a l l y prejudiced" and is e n t i t l e d to the r e l i e f
provided for under the UAPA.
III.

THE COMMISSION FAILED TO STATE ALL RELEVANT
FACTS.

Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Commission's Brief

is required to s t a t e those facts

"relevant to the issues presented for review."

The Statement of

Facts the Commission presented is clearly incomplete.

Conspicu-

ously absent from the Commission's Brief is a r e c i t a t i o n of many
facts

r e l a t i n g to the special designs, materials and

5

functions

No deference to Commission findings of fact should be given in t h i s case
because of the multiple fact-finding, prosecuting, and adjudicating functions
the Commission exercised.
These multiple functions r a i s e due process and
fairness issues because the same entity which supervises and formulates p o l i cies for the Auditing Division also s i t s as the supposedly impartial adjudicator of i t s own p o l i c i e s . See Utah Department of Administrative Services v.
Public Service Commi ssion, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983) ("examples of t h i s
correction of error type of review include whether the Comnission has complied
with the fairness requirements of due process"); Hurley v. Board of Review of
Industrial Commission, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (footnote 3) (Utah 1988) ("in some
cases, however, less deference i s given to factual determinations. For examp l e , a court may exercise greater scrutiny when constitutional rights are at
stake"); and Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School D i s t r i c t ,
391 U.S. 563, 578 (footnote 2) (1968).
-4-

which Morton's facilities serve, and their integral relation to
the production process, which are critical to a proper determination of the case.

To the contrary, Morton's Brief recited in

detail all the relevant facts necessary for a proper determination in this case.

Significantly, the Commission did not dispute

any of the facts Morton recited.

This Court should therefore

adopt Morton's Statement of Facts as set forth in its Brief.
IV.

SECTION 59-12-104(15)
A.

The Commission Attempts
Issues On Appeal.

To

Raise

New

Respondent's Brief on page 19 states that "the Tax Commission

properly

denied

an

exemption

under

Utah

Code

Ann.

S 59-12-104(15) of Petitioner's sodium azide facility because it
is not a 'processing and upgrading plant.'"

Likewise, on page 6,

the Respondent states that the Commission defined "'upgrading'
according

to the usual, ordinary, and accepted definitions of

those terms within the fuels industry."

These statements are

misrepresentations, and an apparent attempt to raise new issues
on appeal.

Nowhere do the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclu-

sions of Law and Final Decision (the "Decision") make any specific definition or finding as to what constitutes a "processing
and upgrading plant," nor did the Commission base its decision to
deny application of the sales tax exemption to Morton on a finding that Morton's facilities did not constitute a "processing and
upgrading plant."
Commission's

These terms are ignored and undefined in the

Decision.

Based

on

-5-

the

Commission's

Decision,

therefore, the scope of review in this appeal is limited to an
interpretation

of

the term synthetic

fuel as used within

the

meaning of Section 59-12-104(15), without deference to the Commission, and not on what the Commission now apparently believes
should have been decided.
B.

The Commission Failed To Define "Synthetic Fuel" By Its Ordinary, Usually
Accepted Meaning.

The Commission limited the definition of synthetic fuel
to a "term of art" without any statutory or legislative guidance
to so restrict or define the term.

While case law provides that

tax exemptions should be narrowly applied to the facts of a given
case, this narrow application of law to facts does not give the
Commission

license

to narrowly define statutory

terms without

some legislative or statutory directive.
Instead, the intent and meaning of statutory terms must
first be understood before the statute can be narrowly applied to
the facts of a given case.

To determine a statute's meaning and

intent, the normal rules of statutory construction should apply,
which require that terms should be given their plain and ordinary
meanings.

An example of this process is Pacific

Intermountain

Express Co. v. State Tax Commission, 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P.2d 650,
652

(1958)

where

this

Court

first

-6-

defined

the

term

"motor

vehicle"

according

application

of

the

to

its

term

ordinary
in

the

and n a t u r a l

context

of

meaning,

the

tax

before

exemption

statute.
The Commission
the

ignores t h i s

common and o r d i n a r y d e f i n i t i o n

and s u b s t i t u t i n g

of

p r o c e s s by d e v i a t i n g
the

term s y n t h e t i c

a more narrow "term of art" d e f i n i t i o n ,

from
fuel,

without

s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y and because the s t a t u t e at i s s u e i s an exemption statute.

Compounding i t s e r r o r , the Commission r e j e c t s

even r i d i c u l e s )
fuel.

Morton's use of a d i c t i o n a r y t o d e f i n e

(and

synthetic

Morton's B r i e f c i t e s s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s in which t h i s Court

has r e f e r r e d t o d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n s for guidance in
ing s t a t u t o r y

interpret-

t h e i r p l a i n and o r d i n a r y mean7
m g , as Morton d i d t o d e f i n e s y n t h e t i c f u e l .
In
fuel,
of

terms t o a s c e r t a i n

opposition

on page 16 of

to

this

i t s Brief,

t h e c a s e s which p e t i t i o n e r

method

of

defining

the Commission s t a t e s
c i t e s used d i c t i o n a r y

synthetic
that

"none

definitions

t o d e f i n e a term of a r t such as s y n t h e t i c f u e l which d e r i v e s
meaning

from

the

scientific

community."

The

its

Commission's

See Ladish Malting Co. v. Wise. Dept. of Revenue, 297 N.W.2d 56 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1980) discussed in Section V.A. infra, where the Wisconsin court,
applying a tax exemption statute, first defined statutory terms according to
their ordinary and commonly accepted meanings before giving that definition a
"strict but reasonable" application to the facts,
7

Contrary to the Commission's argument, the Court has also used the dictionary to define technical or scientific words, see e . g . , Savage Bros. Inc.
v. Public Service Comm'n, 723 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah 1985) (in attempting to
define "dry chemicals" and "barite" as used in a certificate of convenience
and necessity, the Court used the following dictionary definition of "chemical": N[w]e note that a common, generally accepted definition of 'chemical1 i s
'a substance (as an element or chemical compound) obtained by chemical process
or used for producing a chemical effect.'") (emphasis in original).
-7-

argument is improper and misleading because it assumes away the
very issue of this case; i,e., whether, without any legislative
or statutory direction or indication, the Commission can presume
that synthetic fuel is to be defined as a term of art, and limited to Dr. Wiser's definition as used in the oil and gas fuels
o

industry, to the exclusion of other f u e l s
Nowhere in the l e g i s l a t i v e
defined,

industries.

history

is synthetic

nor i s there any indication that s y n t h e t i c fuel

fuel
should

be given a s p e c i f i c or "term of art" d e f i n i t i o n as used in one
segment of the f u e l s industry.

Nor i s there any s t a t u t o r y d i r e c -

t i v e that s y n t h e t i c fuel should have any p a r t i c u l a r meaning.
fact,

as Mr. Anderson t e s t i f i e d ,

In

no one at the Commission knew

what the term s y n t h e t i c fuel was intended to mean.

Tr. at 123.

Words or phrases which are to be given a s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n or
t r e a t e d as a "term of art" are,

in most i n s t a n c e s ,

defined or s e t forth in a d e f i n i t i o n a l
the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n .

specifically

s e c t i o n as a prelude

to

No such statutory d i r e c t i o n i s present

in t h i s c a s e .
There i s no authority or b a s i s for the Commission
reject

a plain

and ordinary d e f i n i t i o n

of

the

term

to

synthetic

f u e l , as provided by Dr. Taylor or as defined in the d i c t i o n a r y ,

8
The Commission's reliance on a term of art advocated by Dr. Wiser is
itself reversible error. As this Court has already stated in First National
Bank of Boston, supra at 9, "the Tax Commission [does not have] the unbridled
discretion to make findings of fact beyond the scope of what is presented in
the hearings . . ." There was no testimony at the Mhearing to the effect that
the Legislature used synthetic fuel as Dr. Wiser's term of art" definition.
-8-

in favor of Dr. Wiser's narrow d e f i n i t i o n applicable only to the
o i l and gas segment of industry.

In f a c t , the Commission never

held that Morton's d e f i n i t i o n was not the plain or ordinary d e f i nition

of

the

term

synthetic

r e j e c t e d a common d e f i n i t i o n

fuel.

Rather,

the

Commission

in favor of an o i l and gas

d e f i n i t i o n advocated by Dr. Wiser.

fuel's

As evident from the record,

Dr. Wiser's experience and the framework from which he defines
s y n t h e t i c fuel i s limited to the o i l and gas industry.
Wiser's testimony i s riddled with i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s .

Yet, Dr.

Under cross

examination, Dr. Wiser admitted that he was not consulted when
the Legislature passed the synthetic fuel exemption, and that he
had no idea what the Legislature meant.

He a l s o admitted that

h i s d e f i n i t i o n was at odds with the d e f i n i t i o n of s y n t h e t i c
as defined

law, even though he claimed to have had
input into federal s t a t u t e s . 9

9

in federal

fuel

Transcript p. 197 line 23 through p. 198 line 4.
Q

[by Mr. Miller]

Let me read i t [the federal statute] again.

A

[by Dr. Wiser]

Q

H

The term 'synthetic fuel 1 means any solid, liquid, or gas."
I'm not asking you whether you agree or disagree with the
definition. That definition i s inconsistent with what you
just told us?

A

That's correct.

All right.

It i s inconsistent.

Transcript p. 204 line 5 through line 12, (emphasis added).
Q

[by Mr. Miller]

All right.

of something e l s e .

Let me probe your understanding

Didn't you testify a moment ago that you

Footnote continued on next page.
-9-

The difficulty with the Commission's Decision is that
the statutory terms are defined as if Dr. Wiser and the Commission had drafted them, rather than the Legislature.

For example,

the Commission first adopts Dr. Wiser's definition of synthetic
fuel which applies only to liquid or gaseous materials.
justify this definition, which
industry,
states:

the Commission

To

is directed to the oil and gas

cites Dr. Wiser's testimony where he

"foremost in the minds of the people involved in syn-

thetic fuels [is] to try to take the pressure off of petroleum
and off of natural gas to, in the first instance, to reduce our
dependence on foreign oil."
added).

Commission's Brief at 12 (emphasis

What is in the minds of Dr. Wiser or his associates in

the oil and gas industry is irrelevant.
what was in the minds of the legislators.

The critical inquiry is
The Commission improp-

erly assumes that the mindset of Dr. Wiser was the mindset of the
Legislature when the statute was enacted.
indication

Clearly absent is any

that the legislators had in their minds to exclude

Footnote continued from previous page.
had no conversations with the [Utah] Legislature when they
passed this particular exemption?
A

[by Dr. Wiser] That's correct. I did not.

Q

You don't have any idea of what they mean, did you?

A

No. • . •

*0
Once again, it should be noted that the only real difference between
Morton's definition and that of Dr. Wiser*s, is that Dr. Wiser1s definition
excludes solid synthetic fuels, otherwise Morton's fuel pellets satisfy Dr.
Wiser's definition. See Morton's Brief at 25.
-10-

solid

materials

from

the

term

synthetic

fuel.

Moreover,

nowhere i s there any indication that s y n t h e t i c f u e l s should be
limited to only those applications in the o i l and gas industry.
Dr. Wiser 1 s d e f i n i t i o n i s inappropriate not because
is

technically

wrong,

but

because

r e l a t e s to the e n t i r e fuels

it

industry.

is

underinclusive

t i o n a l combustible materials used in industry.
both

testified

that

combusted to produce energy.
beyond the o i l

a

it

There are many applica-

t i o n s of s y n t h e t i c f u e l s as alternate energy sources to

Taylor

as

it

synthetic

fuel

tradi-

Dr. Wiser and Dr.
is

a

There are many other

material
instances

and gas

industry where man-made materials are
combusted to produce energy. 12 The fact i s that the fuel p e l l e t ,
l i k e many other s y n t h e t i c fuels which have applications

of the o i l and gas industry,

outside

i s combusted to produce energy and

as such represents an alternate energy source to natural, d e p l e t ing resources of combustible f u e l s .
improper to l i m i t
only s y n t h e t i c

the application

It i s arbitrary, unfair and
of

f u e l s used in the o i l

Section

59-12-104(15)

and gas industry,

to

to the

See the Commission's Hearing Memorandum at 9, Record at 92, where the
Commission first argued for a definition of synthetic fuel that followed a
federal definition which includes solid materials.
12

See e . g . ,
Official Code of Georgia S 38-3-3(3) (1990) which defines
"energy resources" to include "all forms of energy or power including. . .
other fuels of any description. . . ."
(Emphasis added); O.C.G.A.
S 38-3-3(4)(K) (1990) which defines "fuel" in part as any "other substance
used primarily for i t s energy content." (Emphasis added); and Revised Code of
Washington S 43.21F.025(1) which defines "energy" in part as "any other substance or process used to produce heat, light or motion;. . . " (Emphasis
added.)
-11-

exclusion of other applications in the fuels industry, without
some legislative or statutory guidance.
Aside from the general rule that statutory words are to
be given their plain and ordinary meaning, the term synthetic
fuel as used in Section 59-12-104(15) should not be interpreted
as a term of art because there is no basis in case law for making
such a definition.

Terms or phrases which are treated as terms

of art are phrases that have well-established, widely accepted,
13
or previously defined meanings.
For instance, in Atlas Corp.
v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1987), Clovis
asserted that the term "net profits interest" is a term of art in
the mineral industry that defines an independent estate in land.
Id.

The

Court

rejected

Clovis1

assertion

that

"net

profits

interests" should be defined as a term of art because it has not:
acquired a fixed and immutable meaning. . . .
There is no body of law that clearly defines
the nature and incidents of the net profits
interest.
Because the term "net profits
interest" has no uniform meaning, we believe
that "the nature of the [net profits] interest and the rights of its owner must be
determined from the provisions of the instrument which created it."

13

"[A]bsent express direction to the contrary, we presume that a term of
art used in a statute is to be given its usual legal definition." Kelson v.
Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Utah 1989).
-12-

Id,

(citations

omitted).

There
fuel

as

Dr.

is

Wiser

c a s e s which d e f i n e

no body of
defined

it.
15
the term.

Utah

law t h a t

There are
Moreover,

defines

synthetic

no Utah s t a t u t e s
as Dr. Wiser

or

admitted

(Tr. a t 1 9 7 - 2 0 5 ) , t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of s y n t h e t i c f u e l found in f e d eral

law are i n c o n s i s t e n t with the d e f i n i t i o n urged by Dr. Wiser

and adopted by t h e Commission.
There i s

l i k e w i s e no reason why t h e s e p a r a t e words or

terms of a phrase cannot and should not be s e p a r a t e l y d e f i n e d and
then combined t o d e f i n e a g i v e n p h r a s e ,

even i f

term of

Gaxiola,

1303

art.

(Utah

"extreme
76-95-205

For example,
1976),

mental
(1973).

or

a

jury

in S t a t e v .
requested

emotional

the phrase
550 P.2d

clarification

disturbance"

as

used

of

the
in

is a
1298,
term

Section

The t r i a l court i n s t r u c t e d the j u r o r s t o g i v e

t h e terms t h e meaning they would have in common every day use and
d e f i n e d t h e words, "extreme," "mental" and "emotional" as d e f i n e d

14

Examples of terms which have specific meanings, and are commonly understood as terms of art can be seen in various court decisions. See Hansen v.
Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah 1989) ("The term 'governmental
function'. . . i s a term of art long in use by the courts to define those
a c t i v i t i e s of governmental entities to which common law sovereign imnunity
applied"); State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 260 footnote 3 (Utah 1988) ("the
term 'specific intent' has an accepted meaning as a term of art"); State v.
Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Utah 1983) (the Court used the dictionary to
define "simulated" in the phrase "simulated sexual conduct" as i t does not
constitute a legal term of art, and i s recognizable in simple lay terms).
15

"Synthetic fuel" i s not defined in Utah law although there are limited
references to the term. The Utah Code and cases also include hundreds of
references to "fuel" and a handful of references to "synthetic," where synthetic i s used as an adjective modifying a noun.
-13-

in the dictionary.

The defendant objected claiming that "extreme

'mental or emotional disturbance' is a term of art, which derives
its meaning from usage and not from the individual words."

Id.

Upon review of the instruction given by the trial court, this
Court found no error or prejudice to the defendant in individually defining the terms of the statutory phrase.

Id.

In summary, the Commission erroneously assumes, without
authority,

evidence

"term

art";

of

or findings

and

(2)

that

the

(1) synthetic

legislature

fuel

enacting

is a

Section

59-12-104(15) intended synthetic fuel to be defined as a term of
art and given a restrictive meaning within a narrow segment of
the oil and gas industry.

Accordingly, the Commission's Decision

is in error and should be reversed.
C.

The Commission's Definition Of Synthetic
Fuel Is Not Consistent With The Legislative History.

The Commission adopted a definition of synthetic fuel
limited to liquid or gaseous materials used as substitutes in the
oil and gas industry.

By this definition, the Commission is tak-

ing an inconsistent position with what it believes is the legislative history underlying Section 59-12-104(15).

The Commission

argues that the statute's legislative history indicates a legislative intent to benefit the mining industry.

Yet, the Commis-

sion's definition of synthetic fuel, limited to liquid or gaseous
materials applicable in the oil and gas industry, has no relationship to Utah's mining industry and no relationship to Section
59-12-104(15).

In fact, the Legislature specifically excluded
-14-

the oil and gas industry from consideration under this statute.
In its Brief, page 22, the Commission cited Senator Bunnel who
stated:

"The gas and oil sector in Utah is not a problem that is

in need of assistance and that is in need of investment."

The

Commission has failed to explain why an oil and gas definition
should be followed when the Legislature specifically excluded the
oil and gas industry from consideration.
Contrary to the Commission's assertions, Morton's operations do have a direct and real relation to the mining industry.
While it is true that Morton does not engage in actual mining
operations, Morton's fuel pellet is the product of the processing
and upgrading of various minerals which are extracted
from

the ground.

The statute does not require actual mining

activity to be entitled to its benefit.
or

reduction

(mined)

works, but

engages

A person who runs a mill

in no extraction

activities,

would be entitled to relief.
Finally, the Legislature's underlying intent behind the
enactment

of the statute was to promote investment

in capital

intensive industry and to stimulate employment in Utah.
Hearing Memorandum at 26, Record at 159.

Morton's

Against this backdrop,

the Legislature included "synthetic fuel processing and upgrading
plants."

At the time the Legislature included this term in the

statute, there were no synthetic fuel plants in Utah, nor did the
Legislature have a complete idea of what would constitute a synthetic fuel plant.

Ld. (footnote 6).

As noted earlier, Mr.

Anderson who drafted the rule underlying this exemption testified
-15-

that neither he, nor anyone at the Commission, understood what
synthetic fuel was meant to include.

To construe this statute

against taxpayers who have brought capital intensive industry to
Utah whose operations satisfy the normal and ordinary definition
of the term synthetic fuel, is improper and contrary to the Legislature's intent.
V.

SECTION 59-12-104(16).

A.

As Applied
In Other
Jurisdictions,
Morton's F a c i l i t i e s Should Be Treated As
Equipment Because They Are Designed And
Function As Equipment.

The Commission would have t h i s Court b e l i e v e that there
i s no case law or l e g a l precedent which focuses on a s t r u c t u r e ' s
design and function to determine if i t i s machinery or equipment
in connection with statutory provisions exempting machinery and
equipment from t a x a t i o n .

The Commission has gone so far as to

represent to t h i s Court that no such t e s t

e x i s t s and that

the

courts have uniformly rejected such a notion, always concluding
that buildings permanently attached to land can never be treated
as t a n g i b l e personal property.

These statements are i n c o r r e c t ,

misleading and misrepresentations of e x i s t i n g case law applying
"machinery

and

equipment"

exemption

16

statutes

in

other

See specifically the Commission's Brief at 42. "The far-reaching case
law, in addition to supplemental sources, confirms that Petitioner's buildings
or structures qualify as real property, and do not f a l l within the 'equipment1
exemption allowed by Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104(16) or Rule 85S(B). Essent i a l l y , each of the cases directs that any building or structure affixed to
the land i s indisputably real property in any sense of the word. Further, the
Courts have found unpersuasive the argument that Ibuildings permanently affixed
to land can possibly qualify as tangible personal property as Petitioner
argues•" Commission's Brief at 42 (Emphasis added).
-16-

jurisdictions.

Morton did not create a functional use t e s t to

determine if a structure could qualify as machinery or equipment.
The functional use t e s t i s well established and followed in v a r i ous

jurisdictions.
In f a c t , the very cases c i t e d by
18
Commission
apply t h i s functional use t e s t .
For example,

the
the

Commission c i t e s to Busch where the court held a greenhouse to be
real property and not machinery for purposes of a Minnesota s t a t ute that excluded machinery from the d e f i n i t i o n of
subject to t a x a t i o n .

real

estate

What the Commission f a i l e d to d i s c l o s e

is

that in Busch, the court used a "functionality t e s t " as f o l l o w s :
To be exempt as equipment, an item must perform functions d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t from
the functions ordinarily performed by b u i l d ings and other taxable s t r u c t u r e s .
Id. at 815, c i t i n g Crown Coco at 274.
The court in Busch held that the greenhouse was r e a l t y
because the lower court made s p e c i f i c findings of fact that the
greenhouse

served the same s h e l t e r

building,

and

the

court

was

functions

unwilling

to

as a

traditional

overturn

those

17

The Commission's references to case law defining "buildings" or "real
property" are likewise misleading because those cases do not involve "machinery and equipment" exemption statutes.
As stated by the Utah Court of
Appeals: "What i s a building must always be a question of degree." Wagner
Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah App. 1990). Accordingly,
the definition of a "building" or "real property" will vary with the context
in which i t must be construed. See Crown Coco, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 336
N.W. 2d 272, 274 (Minn. 1983) (in determining whether a certain structure was
a building or equipment, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "equipment i s an
exceedingly elastic term, the meaning of which depends on the context."
(Emphasis added).
18

Busch v . County of Hennepin, 380 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1986) and Crown Coco,
Inc. v . Comm'r of Revenue, 336 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 1983).
-17-

findings.
result

The Commission would have t h i s

Court a b i d e by
20
in Busch, but not by i t s a n a l y s i s or s t a n d a r d s .
This same f u n c t i o n a l

in

other

the

use t e s t has been r e p e a t e d l y used

For example, the Wisconsin Court of
21
Appeals has used t h i s t e s t
in applying a Wisconsin s t a t u t e t h a t
exempts

jurisdictions.

from

property

taxation

w

[manufacturing

machinery

and

s p e c i f i c p r o c e s s i n g equipment, e x c l u s i v e l y and d i r e c t l y used by a
manufacturer

in

manufacturing

Ladish a t 5 6 .

The Wisconsin s t a t u t e i s s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r t o t h e

c a s e a t hand in t h a t

tangible

it also specifically

personal

property."

e x c l u d e s " b u i l d i n g s or

b u i l d i n g components" from a p p l i c a t i o n of the machinery and e q u i p ment e x e m p t i o n .

Id.

In L a d i s h ,
tain

structures

the

exemption

t h e court was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h whether

constituted
statute.

As

machinery
noted

or
by

equipment
the

court,

cer-

pursuant
all

to

these

19

But ^ee, Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Greiling, 334 N.W.2d 118, 121
(Wise. 1983) (the Wisconsin Supreme Court, applying the "functional use" test
instead of the "narrow physical appearance" test, held that a greenhouse was
machinery because i t "has an active function of creating and controlling an
environment conducive to the production of floriculture crops.")
20
See Crown Coco, cited by the Commission, which also followed the functional use t e s t ; see KDAL Inc. v. County of St„ Louis, 240 N.W.2d 560, 561
(Minn. 1970) (the court held that a support tower for a television antenna
constitutes equipment because of i t s function irrespective of the fact the
tower was anchored or otherwise attached to real property); see also, Union
Grain Terminal Association v. County of Winona, Nos. 34855 and 35970 (Minn.
T.C. Dec. 15, 1983) (holding that malt houses and kiln buildings were, in
large part, the exterior shells of equipment).
21

Ct.
Ct.
619
and

See Ladish Malting Co. v. Wise. Dept. of Revenue, 297 N.W.2d 56 (Wis.
App. 1980); Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 373 N.W.2d 680 (Wise.
App. 1985) and Heileman Brewing Company v. City of La Crosse, 381 N.W.2d
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (unpublished opinion, available on Lexis). Ladish
Pabst are attached hereto as Exhibits A and B.
-18-

structures "have walls, floors, and ceilings or roof.
very large structures. . . .
ance

from

the outside."

All are

All have a 'building-like' appear-

Id.

at

57.

The

court

cited

with

approval the lower court's framing of the central issue:
What is the meaning of "buildings or building
components"? The noun "building", considered
outside of any factual context is an inert
concept noting in its broadest possible sense
the enclosure of space. . . . Was it the
intent of the legislature to exclude from
exemption any creation which encloses space,
even though it also may functionally contribute to the "transformation of substance"?
Even applying a "strict but reasonable" meaning of the
22
statute,

the court

was unable to apply

the statute

to the

structures at issue because, as the court noted, the structures
all had "the external appearance of buildings, but are designed
to function exclusively as machinery.
tures perform
ceilings,

their

and

appearance."

intended

foundations

Neither could the struc-

functions without

which

make

them

walls, floors,

building-like

in

id. at 58-59.

Because the application of the statute was unclear, the
court went on to cite with approval various other jurisdictions,
both state and federal

investment

tax credit cases, for their

treatment of structures to be classified as buildings or machinery.

See cases discussed in Ladish at 60-61.

Most notable is

the court's statement that:
22

M

[A] strict construction is nonetheless a construction, and an exemption
statute need not be given an unreasonable construction or the narrowest possible construction. A 'strict but reasonable' construction seems to be the
pithy and popular statement of the rule." Id. (citations omitted).
-19-

We need not adopt a strict conformity test,
however, in order to accept persuasive reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions which
have construed statutes similar to our own.
Several such cases, both federal and state,
have resolved issues similar to that before
us by rejecting a narrow "physical appearance" test and applying a "function or use"
test.
Under that test the central question
is whether the structure is one "whose utility is principally and primarily a significantly contributive factor in the actual manufacture
or
production
of
the
product
itself."
Mertens, 5 Law of Federal Income
Taxation sec. 32A.14, at 50 (rev. ed. 1980).
23
Id. at 60 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
Finally, in sanctioning the use of a functionality test
the court stated:
A definition of "buildings" and of "machinery
and equipment" which emphasizes actual function and use over physical appearance, sheer
size, and remotely potential use, elevates
substance over form. It also makes sense.
Id. at 62. 24

The
building-like

court

in

appearance,

Ladish
noting

ignored
that

the

the

structures1

structures

did

not

23

It should be noted that the test cited by the court, from Mertens, pertains to the federal investment tax credit provisions. Morton agrees with the
court in Ladish and reasserts that the federal guidelines under I.R.C. S 38
provide "persuasive reasoning" as to the construction and application of
Utah's machinery and equipment exemption statute.
24

See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 466-470 (1935) (the Gregory
case i s a landmark tax case which i s repeatedly cited for the proposition that
form should not be elevated over substance. "To hold otherwise would be to
exalt a r t i f i c e above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of a l l serious purpose.")
-20-

serve the functions of a t r a d i t i o n a l building, 25 and concluded
that

because

the

structures

were designed

and

functioned

as

machinery, they should be so treated.
Five

years

later

the

Wisconsin

Court

of

Appeals

reviewed a similar factual case in Pabst, supra, under the same
machinery and equipment exemption s t a t u t e .

Once again, the court

followed the functional use over an appearance t e s t and concluded
26
that Pabst's structures

were designed and functioned as equip-

ment and should not be treated,
statute,

as b u i l d i n g s .

for purposes of

As stated by the court,

the

exemption

"a s t r u c t u r e ' s

external appearance does not determine whether i t i s a b u i l d i n g .
Rather, the question i s whether the structure i s being used as a
building in the taxpayer's hands."

Id. at 685 (emphasis added).

The court went on to s t a t e :
The passive nature of the c e l l a r walls and
framing must not be allowed to obscure the
fact that t h e i r s o l e reason for e x i s t e n c e i s
to create the conditions that permit ferment a t i o n of beer on a mass-production s c a l e .

25

"The three structures may be entered by employees for maintenance or
clearing but are not generally occupied by employees during the course of
manufacturing process." Id. at 58. Note the similarity with Morton's f a c i l i t i e s where employees are not permitted inside the f a c i l i t i e s during
operations.
26
xhe "head house" i s "a 56-feet t a l l structure. . . of poured concrete"
and the malt house "has six stores, multiple rooms, stairs, an elevator, and
office space." Id. at 688.
-21-

id. at 691.
The fact that some human activity, incidental to a structure's function, is carried
on within the structure, does not mean, that
the structure provides general working space.
Id. at 688.

Contrary to the Commission's a s s e r t i o n s , t h i s issue has
been addressed in various other j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have adopted
a functional

use t e s t .

The record in t h i s case

is clear

and

uncontroverted, Morton's f a c i l i t i e s were designed to function as
equipment.

These f a c i l i t i e s are e s s e n t i a l to production and thus

q u a l i f y for exemption under the s t a t u t e .
sion

and Brief

demonstrate

The Commission's Deci-

an unwillingness

to

admit

that

a

f a c i l i t y which serves the function and purpose of equipment may
be treated as such for purposes of Section 5 9 - 5 - 1 0 4 ( 1 6 ) .

The

Commission provided no testimony or evidence rebutting Morton's
e x t e n s i v e testimony that the f a c i l i t i e s operate as equipment and
are e s s e n t i a l

to operations.

The Commission's only attempt

27

to

The court also cited Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Wanamaker, 144
N.Y.S.2d 458, 462 (App. Div. 1955), aff'd, 157 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1956) which
stated:
The structures and supports which house and steady the
machinery are essential to production. They are physically annexed to the machinery, specially designed
therefor, and necessary to the proper functioning
thereof. As a whole, the plant i s a producing unit.
The structures do not play as active a role as, for
example, the turbine. But activity i s not the test of
directness. The walls of the boiler have a "passive"
function in one sense. The important thing i s that
a l l parts of the plant contribute, continuously and
v i t a l l y , to production, and they are a l l integrated
and harmonized. (Emphasis added)
-22-

show t h a t

the

reference

t o Kurt H a l l e s y ' s

possible

to

See p .

29 of

dealing

with

facilities

conduct

are not

testimony

operations

the Commission's
sales

essential

taxation

to operations

that

it

is

is

a

theoretically

with

a skeletal infrastructure.
28
Brief.
Y e t , in a r e c e n t c a s e

of

computer

software,

this

Court

agreed w i t h t h e Vermont Supreme C o u r t ' s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t for purp o s e s of t a x a t i o n ,

t r a n s a c t i o n s should be taxed on what

o c c u r r e d and not based on some h y p o t h e t i c a l ,
29
alistic basis.
B.

actually

t h e o r e t i c a l or u n r e -

The Uncontroverted Record E s t a b l i s h e s
t h a t Morton's F a c i l i t i e s Are Not Real
Property.

As t h i s Court s t r e s s e d

in F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank of

Bos-

t o n , s u p r a , any d e c i s i o n rendered by the Commission must be based
upon t h e r e c o r d .

That r u l e i s important b e c a u s e ,

in t h e p r e s e n t

c a s e , t h e record i s c l e a r and u n c o n t r o v e r t e d t h a t Morton's

facil-

i t i e s f u n c t i o n as equipment; and c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r i o r Commission
audits,

the

property
Calon

K.

facilities

attached

to

Anderson.

should

be

treated

real

property.

Mr.

Anderson

as

tangible

Consider
has

18

personal

the Testimony

years

of

of

auditing

28

This "theoretical" notion ignores the regulatory environment surrounding
Morton's f a c i l i t i e s which would prohibit Morton from operating i t s f a c i l i t i e s
as the Commission theorizes.
See, for example, Chapters 11, 13 and 14 of
Title 26 of the Utah Code relating to the regulation of water, air and hazardous waste pollution.
29
» T 0 base the tax consequences of a transaction on how i t could have been
structured 'would require rejection of the established tax principle that a
transaction i s to be given i t s tax effect in accord with what actually
occurred and not in accord with what might have occurred.'" Mark 0. Harold sen
v. State Tax Commission, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (November 27, 1990) (emphas i s added) (citations omitted). See also Gregory, supra.
-23-

e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e Commission, p e r s o n a l l y d r a f t e d Rule 85S r and
conducted over 100 a u d i t s *
established

an

entitled

the

to

Commission

His t e s t i m o n y was c l e a r t h a t

uncontroverted

failed

relief

record

that

provided by S e c t i o n

to c a l l

a single witness

dence t o r e f u t e Mr. Anderson's t e s t i m o n y .
rebuttal

to

Morton's

witnesses

regarding h i s motives.
sion's

Brief

("Calon

its

is

to

See page 25,
K.

Anderson

is

facilities

were

59-12-104(16).

The

or p r o v i d e

any

evi-

The Commission's

only

make

negative

footnote
a

Morton

former

7 of

innuendos

t h e Commis-

employee

of

the

A u d i t i n g D i v i s i o n of the Utah S t a t e Tax Commission who p a r t e d on
unpleasant
between

terms from t h e Tax Commission b e c a u s e of

himself

and

the

present

Director

of

differences

the

Auditing

Division.")30
Based on h i s

extensive

Anderson a p p l i e d t h e same t e s t s

experience

as an a u d i t o r ,

in e v a l u a t i n g Morton's c l a i m

Mr.
for

an exemption from s a l e s t a x e s which the Commission used in p r i o r

30
This Court has already stated i t s opinion as to such remarks, "Derogatory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind has no place
in an appellate brief and i s of no assistance to this Court in attempting to
resolve any legitimate issues presented on appeal." State v. Cooky 714 P.2d
296f 297 (Utah 1986).
American logicians Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel have given a brief
definition of the Commission's technique in Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction
to Logic and Scientific Method (1934), 380: "The fallacy of the argumentum ad
hominem, a very ancient but s t i l l popular device to deny the logical force of
an argument (and thus to prove the opposite), i s to abuse the one who advances
the argument."
-24-

audits,

Mr. Anderson likewise cited prior circumstances where

permanent, building-like structures were not treated by the Commission as real property. 32 This testimony lies in the record
uncontroverted, but
its inconsistent
other

similar

ignored.

The Commission has not explained

treatment of Morton's facilities, compared to
facilities,

as

required

by

Section

63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).
CONCLUSION
The Commission grossly erred in its responsibility to
establish evidence or support in the record for its interpretation of the relevant statutes.

If this Court is to give real

meaning to its prior decisions that a final decision must stand
upon the record, this Court must

rule in favor of Morton and

reverse the Decision of the Commission.
DATED this 15th day of January, 1991.

MAXWfcVt/A. MfLLfiR
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW
RICHARD M. MARSH
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
A t t o r n e y s for P e t i t i o n e r

Ji

Moreover, Mr. Anderson used the same three part test followed by this
Court. "In determining whether equipment has become a fixture, this Court has
applied a three-part t e s t : annexation, adaptation, and intent." General Leasing v. Manifest Corp., 667 P.2d 586, 597 (Utah 1983).
32

See Morton's Brief at 36.
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LADISH MALTING CO., a Wisconsin
corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant,
Town of Aztalan, Defendant.
Nos. 79-495 to 79-498.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
Argued Aug. 21, 1980.
Opinion Released Aug. 21, 1980.
Opinion Filed Aug. 21, 1980.
Review Denied.
Department of Revenue appealed from
judgment of the Circuit Court, Jefferson
County, John B. Danforth, J., determining
that certain property used by taxpayer in
manufacture of malt was exempt from
property taxes. The Court of Appeals, Bablitch, J., held that attemporators, kilns,
and malt elevators used in the malting
process were machinery or equipment and
not buildings within contemplation of statute exempting manufacturing machinery
and processing equipment, but not buildings, from property taxation.
Affirmed.
Taxation *=>237
Attemporators, kilns, and malt elevators, building-like structures used in transformation of barley into malt, were machinery or equipment and not buildings within
contemplation of statute which exempted
manufacturing machinery and processing
equipment, but not buildings, from property
taxation. W.S.A. 70.11(27).

Before GARTZKE, P. J., and BABLITCH
and DYKMAN, JJ.
BABLITCH, Judge.
This is an appeal by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (department) from a
judgment determining that certain property used by the Ladish Malting Company
(taxpayer) in the manufacture of malt was
exempt from property taxes under sec. 70.11(27), Stats. The taxpayer brought four
separate actions seeking declaratory judgment and a refund of taxes paid to the
defendant Town of Aztalan from 1974
through 1977 based on the department's
assessments. The town is not a party to
this appeal. The actions were heard together on the basis of a detailed stipulation
of facts, disposed of by a single judgment
ordering a total refund of $375,125, and
consolidated on appeal. We affirm.
Section 70.11(27), Stats., was created by
ch. 90, Laws of 1973, as a part of the budget
bill. The subsection embodies the so-called
"M & E" exemption from property taxation
of "[manufacturing machinery and specific
processing equipment, exclusively and directly used by a manufacturer in manufacturing tangible personal property." The
exempted property is defined by the statute
as:

John C. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for
defendant-appellant; Bronson C. La Foilette, Atty. Gen., and E. Weston Wood,
Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief.

any combination of electrical, mechanical
or chemical means, including special
foundations therefor, designed to work
together in the transformation of materials or substances into new articles or
components, including parts therefor, regardless of ownership and regardless of
attachment to real property. This shall
not be construed to include materials,
supplies, buildings or building components; nor shall it include equipment,
tools or implements used to service or
maintain manufacturing machinery or
equipment. [Emphasis supplied.]

John A. Hazelwood (argued) and Elwin J.
Zarwell, Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, on
brief, for plaintiff-respondent.

The disputed items of property are attemporators, kilns, and malt elevators. It is
undisputed that each of these items is used
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exclusively and directly by the taxpayer in
the transformation of barley into malt.
The parties stipulate that "but for the
building-building component exception" to
the M & E exemption, the property would
not be taxable.
The department's main contention is that
none of the properties is a machine because
each of them is a "building" within the
meaning of the italicized exclusion from the
definition of machinery and equipment set
forth above. In its reply brief on appeal,
however, it also contends that the exemption "applies only to machinery which is not
a building or building component."
The department thereby proffers, though
it does not press, two inconsistent views of
the statute. Under its first contention machinery and equipment on the one hand,
and buildings or building components on
the other, are mutually exclusive categories
of property. Under its second contention
they are not. Because we agree with the
trial court's determination that the structures in question are machinery or equipment and are not buildings within the contemplation of the statute, we need not address the question whether it is possible for
one structure to fit both categories simultaneously nor whether any such structure
would be entitled to the statutory exemption.
The structures involved in this case share
certain characteristics. All have walls,
floors, and ceilings or roofs. At least the
kiln and the attemporator have foundations. All are very large structures comporting, as the trial court noted, with the
magnitude of the taxpayer's operations.
All have a "building-like" appearance from
the outside. Each performs an independent, essential function in the manufacturing process by which malt meeting the various specifications of the taxpayer's customers is made.
The parties agree that an attemporator is
similar to a "giant air conditioner-humidifier." Its function is to maintain the exact
temperature and humidity conditions required to induce the germination of barley
1. The taxable status of the malt house itself is
not at issue on this appeal

kernels-the first step of the malt-making
procedure-within "growing compartments"
inside the taxpayer's malt house.1 Each
attemporator consists of a fan and three
compartments attached to a growing compartment. The fan forces air to circulate
past water sprays in the compartments of
the attemporator, where it is saturated to
100 percent humidity. The air is then
forced into the growing compartments.
The parties agree that no part of the attemporator's walls, ceiling, or floor has any
value solely on its own, and that the same
are designed to channel the moisturized air
through the attemporator and into the
growing compartments. The outer shells of
the taxpayer's attemporators, which are
custom made, are composed of one-half
inch of transite (a corrugated asbestos and
concrete material), the same as the outer
shell of the malt houses to which they are
attached. Commercially produced attemporators made of stainless steel are available
on the market. They perform exactly the
same function as the taxpayer's attemporators and do not look like buildings.
After germination has occurred to the
desired degree, the resultant "green malt"
is transferred to kilns, which are self-supported brick wall enclosures, for heating
and drying. Huge fans at the top of the
structure draw heated air up through three
tiers of trays with perforated bottoms upon
which the grain is spread. The trays have
louvers which are opened manually from
time to time to allow the grain at the
higher levels to fall to the tray beneath at
the appropriate stage in the drying process.
The temperature inside the kiln may reach
as high as 220 degrees Fahrenheit, depending on the type of malt being produced.
After drying is completed to the required
specifications, the grain is placed in malt
elevators for aging and blending according
to the individual customer's order. Aging
is an organic process during which the moisture content in the kernels of green malt
stabilize at a uniform level from the center
of each kernel to its outer shell. The tax-
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payer has more than 50 brewery customers,
each of which specifies the length of time
the ordered malt is to be aged and the
particular mix of different malts desired.
Externally the malt elevators look like barley elevators in which the barley is stored
prior to the malt-making process. The taxable status of the storage elevators is not
challenged by the taxpayer. The malt elevators contain rows of bins in which different types of malts are kept. The particular
mix ordered by the customers is blended by
regulating the flow of various malts onto
conveyor belts beneath the bins. The final
mix is transported to shipping bins, which
are not involved in this appeal.
The three structures may be entered by
employees for maintenance or cleaning but
are not generally occupied by employees
during the course of the manufacturing
process. The attemporators, kilns and malt
elevators are monitored on an almost totally automated basis from a central control
room in a different location.
Employees are not inside the attemporators during any time they are operating.
When employees enter the kilns each day to
manually rotate the louvers and dump the
tray floors, they must pass through an air
lock adjoining the kiln because of the enormous difference in external and internal air
pressure. The temperature within the kiln
is reduced to 100 degrees during such times.
Access to the top of the malt elevators for
servicing the conveyor equipment is provided by a concrete stair tower or a man lift.
It is very unusual for an employee to be
inside a malt bin, and this never occurs
when there is an appreciable amount of
malt within the bin.
There are no plumbing, heating or cooling
facilities within the three structures except
as they specifically relate to the manufacturing processes which occur within them.
There is electric wiring for lighting and
manufacturing purposes, but no toilets, rest
areas or other "creature comforts" inside
any of them.
We cannot improve on the trial court's
designation of the central issue. It asked:

What is the meaning of "buildings or
building components"? The noun "building", considered outside of any factual
context is an inert concept noting in its
broadest possible sense the enclosure of
space. . . . Was it the intent of the
legislature to exclude from exemption
any creation which encloses space, even
though it also may functionally contribute to the "transformation of substance"?
The answers to these questions are not
clear from the face of the statute, even
applying the appropriate rules of construction. Pursuant to those rules, a tax exemption statute is to be strictly construed
against granting the exemption since "tax
exemptions, deductions and privileges are
matters of legislative grace." Ramrod, Inc.
v. Department of Revenue, 64 Wis.2d 499,
504, 219 N.W.2d 604, 607 (1974). Moreover,
the burden of bringing the property in
question within the terms of the exemption
is on the taxpayer, and any doubts that he
has done so are to be resolved in favor of
taxation. Ramrod, 64 Wis.2d at 504, 219
N.W.2d at 607; First Nat Leasing Corp. v.
Madison, 81 Wis.2d 205, 208,260 N.W.2d 251
(1977). On the other hand, the supreme
court has stated:
"[A] strict construction is nonetheless a
construction, and an exemption statute
need not be given an unreasonable construction or the narrowest possible construction. A 'strict but reasonable' construction seems to be the pithy and popular statement of the rule." Columbia
Hospital Assn. v. Milwaukee, 35 Wis.2d
660, 668, 151 N.W.2d 750, 754 (1967),
quoted with approval in First Nat Leasing Corp., 81 Wis. at 208-09, 260 N.W 2d
at 253.
The "strict but reasonable" meaning of
the statute in question is elusive when applied to the structures at issue. The legislature plainly intended to exempt manufacturing machinery and equipment exclusively used in transforming raw products into
merchantable goods, while withholding the
exemption from buildings and building
components. The three structures in this
case all have the external appearance of
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buildings, but are designed to function exclusively as machinery The attemporators
are giant air-conditioners and humidifiers
The kilns are giant ovens Neither could
perform their intended functions without
the walls, floors, ceilings, and foundations
which make them buildmg-hke in appearance The malt-elevators, though less machine-like than the other two structures,
are nonetheless more than passive storage
units such as the barley or shipping elevators Within them an organic change in the
malt takes place which is essential to the
production process They are designed to
custom-mix the different varieties of separately aged malts to the specifications of
each customer Their function is not dissimilar from that of smaller specific processing equipment designed, for example, to
custom blend paints, dyes, or foods
Neither the attemporators nor the kilns
could be used as "buildings" in the commonly used sense of providing shelter for persons or animals, or storage space for property, without substantial alterations While
the malt elevators could conceivably be
used to shelter and store malt, their use is
committed to a more ambitious purpose
When the meaning of a statute is not
clear on its face, we may look to extrinsic
sources to determine legislative intent2
Our examination of the legislative history
of sec 70 11(27), Stats, persuades us that
the legislature did not intend to include
structures such as those at issue, which
function as manufacturing machinery or
equipment, within the "building-building
component" exception to the M & E exemption
The parties have stipulated that the language of the statute as finally enacted was
adopted by a conference committee of the
legislature after meetings with representatives of the department and of industry
The meetings were requested by the committee, which was studying a proposed
draft of a senate bill creating the M & E
2.

Monson v Monson 85 Wis 2d 794 800 271
N W 2 d 137 (Ct App 1978) State e\ rel Gut
brod v Wolke 49 Wis 2d 736 742 183 N W 2d
161 (1971) Kmdy v Hayes 44 Wis 2d 301
308, 171 N W 2 d 324 (1969) Perry Creek C

exemption As a result of these meetings,
the representatives of industry and of the
department agreed on certain changes in
the original language, which were incorporated by the committee in the bill reported
out to and passed without further alteration by both houses of the legislature
The original draft of the bill excluded
"structures or fixtures," rather than "buildings or building components," from the M &
E exemption It also required that property attached to real estate* must be "capable
of removal without substantial damage" to
the real estate in order to qualify for the
exemption The latter requirement was
stricken from the bill which was finally
enacted, and the broad "structures or fixtures" language was replaced by the
present, narrower "buildings and building
components " But for these changes, there
is little doubt that the property in question
would not have qualified for the exemption
The stipulation recites that the phrase
"buildings and building components" was
adopted by the committee at the suggestion
of industrial representatives, who expressly
stated that the change in language would
bring the bill into conformity with a similar
phrase in 26 U S C A sec 48(aXlXB) of the
federal Internal Revenue Code relating to
investment credits That section provides
the credit for tangible personal property
"used as an integral part of manufacturing," but excludes "a building and its structural components " A known body of federal law had developed to interpret this
phrase
The taxpayer contends that the legislature's adoption of the phrase suggested by
the industrial representatives evinces its intent that the M & E exemption be construed in conformity with the federal investment credit statute Under this approach, any property qualifying for the
credit under federal authority, such as each
of the structures involved in this case,
Corp v Hopkins \g Chem Co 29 Wis 2d 429,
435 139 N W 2d 96 (1966) Cttv of Milwaukee
v Milwaukee County 27 Wis 2d 53, 56 133
N W 2 d 3 9 3 (1965)
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would presumably be entitled to the M & E
exemption. We agree with the department
that this approach is unwarranted.3 Although the credit and the exemption were
doubtless enacted for similar reasons-to
stimulate business and encourage industrial
investment-they relate to different kinds of
taxes and serve the intended purpose in
different ways. In addition, the expressed
intention of individuals advising the legislature, through a conference committee, is
inconclusive evidence of an identical legislative intention.4
We need not adopt a strict conformity
test, however, in order to accept persuasive
reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions
which have construed statutes similar to
our own.5 Several such cases, both federal
and state, have resolved issues similar to
that before us by rejecting a narrow "physical appearance" test and applying a "function or use" test. Under that test the central question is whether the structure is one
"whose utility is principally and primarily a
significantly contributive factor in the actual manufacture or production of the product
itself." Mertens, 5 Law of Federal Income
Taxation sec. 32A.14, at 50 (rev. ed. 1980).
In Brown-Forman Distillers Corporation
v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263, 205 Ct.Cl.
402 (1974), for example, the court held that
large structures designed to age whiskey in
a controlled environment, and which were
entered by the taxpayer's employees only
for repairs, maintenance, loading and unloading, were entitled to the investment
3.

Ladtsh Co. v Department of Revenue, 69
Wis.2d 723, 233 N.W 2d 354 (1975), upon
which the taxpayer relies, is inapposite The
case dealt with the construction of a state income tax statute which was virtually identical
to its counterpart in the Internal Re\ enue Code,
and an explanatory note to the bill which became the statute indicated that uniformity between state and federal laws was intended
Master Lock Co. v Department of Re\enue. 62
Wis.2d 716, 215 N W2d 529 (1974) and Industrial Comm v Woodlawn Cemetery Asso, 232
Wis. 527, 287 N.W. 750 (1939), both of which
dealt with identical state-federal statutes, are
similarly distinguishable.

4. See A. O. Smith Corp v. Department ot Re\ enue, 43 Wis.2d 420. 427, 168 N W 2d 887, 890
(1969), where the supreme court ruled that

credit. The fact that the structures "have
features in common with buildings" was
held not to be determinative. The real
question, the court said, was "whether they
are functioning or being used as 'buildings'
in the taxpayer's hands." 499 F.2d at 1271.
A major consideration in answering that
question was that the working space provided in the structures for employees was no
more than "merely incidental to the principal function or use of the structure." 499
F.2d at 1271. Cf. Sunnyside Nurseries, 59
T.C. 113 (1972), appeal dismissed, see Thirup
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 508
F.2d 915, 918 n.2, A.L.R.Fed. 299 (9th Cir.
1974), and Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122 (1972),
rev'd. sub nom. Thirup v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 508 F.2d 915, 39 A.L.R.
Fed. 299 (9th Cir. 1974), holding that certain
greenhouses were buildings, rather than
machines, because the taxpayer's employees
spent their full work days within them.
The fact that a structure could be physically altered to serve building-like, as well
as machine-like functions, was held to be
irrelevant to its tax status in Yellow
Freight System, Inc. v. United States, 413
F.Supp. 357 (W.D.Mo.1975), rev'd. on other
grounds, 538 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1976). The
court observed:
Indeed, in their present form the structures are of no use to plaintiff or anyone
else except for the purposes for which
they were specifically designed and for
which they are used. The fact that expenditures for labor and materials might
render a structure suitable for other uses
" '[Legislative acts must be construed from
their own language, uninfluenced by what the
persons introducing or preparing the bill actually intended to accomplish by it.' Moorman
Mfg Co. v Industrial Comm., 241 Wis. 200, 5
N W.2d 743" [quoting Estate of Matzke, 250
Wis 204, 208. 26 N.W 2d 659. 661 (1947)]. But
see Buehler Bros. v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis.
371. 373-74, 265 N.W. 227 (1936); Pellett v.
Industrial Commission, 162 Wis 596, 601, 156
NW. 956 (1916), Sutherland, 2A Statutory
Construction sec. 48.12 at 214-15 (4th ed.
1973).
5. Cf. Master Lock Co. v. Department of Revenue, 62 Wis.2d 716, 215 N.W.2d 529 (1974);
Columbia Hospital Asso. v. Milwaukee, 35
Wis.2d 660, 670, 151 N.W.2d 750 (1967).
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does not alter the fact that the structure
in its unaltered state is not a 'building'
Id. at 370.
The use-function approach has also been
employed by state courts. In Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 101, 53 A.2d 250,
172 A.L.R. 302 (1947), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned a lower court's ruling that oil refinery tanks were not "machinery" entitled to exemption. In language especially pertinent to the malt elevators at issue in this case, the supreme
court criticized the lower court's logic in
concluding that because the action which
took place in the tanks was "chemical," and
not "mechanical," the tanks were merely
processing agents and not manufacturing
machinery. 357 Pa. at 108, 53 A.2d at 253,
172 A.L.R. at 307. The court said:
Much of the machinery today has only
passive or motionless functions to perform in manufacturing.
It is as logical to hold that the storage
tanks in which take place physical and
chemical processes necessary to the refinement of oil, are machinery as it is to
hold that the smelters used in making
metal are machinery. 357 Pa. at 109-110,
53 A.2d at 254, 172 A.L.R. at 307-08.
[Footnote omitted.] 6
See also Board of Assessors of Swampscott
v. Lynn Sand & Stone Co., 360 Mass. 595,
277 N.E.2d 97, 99 & 99 n.3 (1971), which
held that "certain very bulky machinery:"
such as a 50-ton silo and a 300-ton sand bin
did not lose their "predominant aspect" as
manufacturing machinery entitled to tax
exemption merely by virtue of bulk or being affixed to buildings which themselves
were taxable as real estate.
The department has brought to our attention Pu6//c Service Elec. & Gas Co. v. TP. of
6. The supreme court was also critical ot the
lower court's conuction that silos, to which it
had likened the refiners tanks, would not be
exempt from taxation, observing
Insofar as a silo's function is merel\ preservative it has no part in manufacturing but as
the fermentation of the silage in the silo
torms certain organic acids which prevent
the development ot molds on the fodder a silo
does have, pro tanto, a part in the manufacturing of silage The fermentation which

Woodbridge, 73 N.J. 474, 375 A.2d 1165
(1977), which held that structures housing
energy generating apparatus of electric
light and power companies were taxable
"buildings," and not exempt "machinery"
under that state's statutes. A lower court
had held that such structures were exempt
because they were " 'adapted and adaptable
only to shelter and support generating
equipment' and are therefore, in effect,
'Electric Generating Stations'
and hence part of the 'machinery, apparatus
and equipment' exempt from direct property taxation under the act." 73 N.J. at
477-78, 375 A.2d at 1166. The New Jersey
Supreme Court's disapproval of the lower
court's determination does not support the
department's position on this appeal. The
supreme court noted that the structures in
question were more than just shelters for
equipment because they "are also workplaces for personnel," containing control rooms
with such conveniences as heating, air conditioning, and toilets. It said that the word
"building" must be given its "generally accepted meaning," and approved the following definition:
A "building" in the usual and ordinary
acceptation of the word is a structure
designed and suitable for habitation or
sheltering human beings and animals,
sheltering or storing property, or for use
and occupation for trade or manufacture.
73 N.J. at 479, 375 A.2d at 1167. [Emphasis in original.]
That definition, which is comparable to
the more detailed definition of "building
and structural components" set forth in 26
C.F.R. sec. 1.48-1(e) with respect to the
investment credit exception,7 cannot be said
to apply to any of the three structures at
issue in this case. None of them is designed
or suitable for the shelter of persons, occugoes on in the silo produces, under proper
conditions, sweet silage" as fodder To that
extent the silo ma\ be properh considered as
part of the machinery ot producing fodder
357 Pa at 110 n 2, 53 A 2d at 254 n 2, 172
A L R at 308 n 2
7. 26 C F R sec 1 48 1(e)(1) defines "buildings
and structural components" in pertinent part
as follows
The term "building" generally means any
structure or edifice enclosing a space within
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pation, or simple storage. Each is designed malt aging-blending elevators. This court
to process raw materials into a final prod- perceives no possible distinction.
uct, and for no other purpose. They are
For these reasons the judgment of the
also used for that and no other purpose. trial court is affirmed.
A definition of "buildings'* and of "maJudgment affirmed.
chinery and equipment" which emphasizes
actual function and use over physical appearance, sheer size, and remotely potential
G I KCYNUMB£RSYSTEM>
use, elevates substance over form. It also
makes sense. Internal correspondence of
the department, which are exhibits to the
98Wis.2d511
parties1 stipulation, indicate that the department has inclined towards the function- Thomas SCHWAAB, Plaintiff-Appellant,
al approach as a matter of policy with rev.
spect to air conditioners and humidifiers,
wood-kilns, brewery fermenting tanks, cer- TOWN OF SUMMIT, Robert Hasselkus
and Michael Jones, individually and as a
tain equipment used to age natural cheeses,
member of the Town Board, Defendand other items which in its view either are
ants-Respondents.
or "may have to be considered" as machinery entitled to exemption under the statute.
No. 79-1831.
As to such items, the department, like the
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
other authorities cited in the opinion, has
Argued May 28, 1980.
taken a broader view of the scope of the tax
benefits granted to manufacturing machinOpinion Released Aug. 22, 1980.
ery, as opposed to buildings, than the view
Opinion Filed Aug. 22, 1980.
which it now urges on this court. It offers
no basis for distinction between air conditioners and attemporators, wood kilns and
Town chairman brought declaratory
malt kilns, cheese aging equipment and judgment action challenging validity of an
its walls, and usually covered by a roof, the
purpose of which is, for example, to provide
shelter or housing or to provide working,
office, parking, display, or sales space. The
term includes, for example, structures such
as apartment houses, factory and office
buildings, warehouses, barns, garages, railway or bus stations, and stores
Such term does not include (i) a structure
which is essentially an item of machinery or
equipment, or (11) a structure which houses
property used as an integral part of an activity specified in section 48(a)(l)(B)(i) if the use
of the structure is so closely related to the
use of such property that the structure clearly can be expected to be replaced when the
property it initially houses is replaced Factors which indicate that a structure is closely
related to the use of the property it houses
include the fact that the structure specifically
designed to provide for the stress and other
demands of such property and the fact that
the structure could not be economically used
for other purposes. Thus, the term "building" does not include such structures as oil
and gas storage tanks, gram storage bins,
silos, fractionating towers, blast furnaces, basic oxygen furnaces, coke ovens, brick kilns,
and coal tipples.

(2) The term "structural components" includes such parts of a building as walls, partitions, floors, and ceilings, as well as any
permanent coverings therefor such as paneling or tiling, windows and doors; all components
relating to the operation or
maintenance of a building. However, the
term "structural components" does not include machinery the sole justification for the
installation of which is the fact that such
machinery is required to meet temperature or
humidity requirements which are essential
tor the operation of other machinery or the
processing of materials or foodstuffs Machinery may meet the "sole justification" test
provided by the preceding sentence even
though it incidentally provides for the comfort of employees, or serves, to an insubstantial degree, areas where such temperature or
humidity requirements are not essential. For
example, an air conditioning and hunrudification system installed in a textile plant in
order to maintain the temperature or humidity within a narrow optimum range which is
critical in processing particular types of yarn
or cloth is not included within the term
"structural components."
[Emphasis supplied.]
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PABST BREWING COMPANY, a foreign corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CITY OF MILWAUKEE, a municipal
corporation, Defendant and
Co-Appellant,
Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 84-2023.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
Submitted on Briefs May 7, 1985.
Opinion Released July 15, 1985.
Opinion Filed July 15, 1985.
Review Denied.
Brewing company sought declaratory
judgment on the tax status of certain structures. The Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, Hugh R. O'Connell and Rudolph T. Randa, JJ., determined that such structures
were exempt from property tax and that
brewing company was entitled to refund of
taxes paid between 1974 and 1983. City
and Department of Revenue appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Sullivan, J., held
that: (1) barley bins, malt house, head
house, and cellars were machinery or
equipment exclusively and directly used in
the production of beer and, thus, were exempt from property tax, but (2) trial court's
declaration as to tax status of such structures for the years 1981, 1982, and 1983,
which years were subsequent to the years
in issue at trial, was improper.
Judgment and order affirmed in part
and reversed in part.

1. Appeal and Error <£»842(9)
When question on appeal is whether
statutory concept embraces a particular set
of factual circumstances, reviewing court is
generally presented with a mixed question
of law and fact.

2. Stipulations <&=>14(10)
Where party stipulated to the essentl
facts, Court of Appeals was faced osd
with ultimate question of whether the fail
fulfilled statutory standards that would 8
empt the structures from property ttij
which question was a question of lawlj
which the Court would not defer to the tria
court. W.S.A. 70.11(27).
3. Appeal and Error <8=>842(1)
On questions of law, the Court of Aj
peals does not defer to the trial cour1
4. Administrative Law and Procedui
e=*760
Where administrative agency's expw
Use is significant to the determinate
Court of Appeals will accord some weig|
to agency's decision, but that decision
not controlling.
5. Taxation e»204(2)
Tax exemption statute is to be s
i
construed against granting the exemptioi
6. Taxation <£»251
Burden of bringing property in quel
tion within terms of tax exemptior ia <*
taxpayer.
7. Taxation «=>204(2)
Tax exemption statute need not uc gn
etf the narrowest possible construction.
8. Taxation <3=>237
A structure's external appearance does
not determine whether it is a "building" for
purposes of W.S.A. 70.11(27), exempting
manufacturing machinery and equipment,
but not buildings, from property tax; rather, question is whether structure is being
used as a building in taxpayer's hand*.
9. Taxation <fc»237
In determining whether a structure
functions as a "building" in taxpayer*!
hands, for purposes of W.S.A. 70.11(27),
exempting manufacturing machinery and

PABST BREWING CO. v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE

Wis.

681

Cite a« 373 \.W.2d 680 (WU.App. 1985)

equipment, but not buildings, from property tax, court must first determine whether
structure was designed, and is principally
employed, to provide shelter or housing to
humans or animals; storage for property;
or working, office, parking, sales, or display space for trade or industry.
10. Taxation <s»237
Under the function or use test used to
determine whether a structure constitutes
manufacturing machinery or equipment exempt from property tax under W.S.A. 70.11(27), question asked is whether structure's utility is "principally and primarily"
a significant contributing factor in a product's manufacture.
11. Taxation <^237
Incidental use of manufacturing property for nonexempt purpose does not violate requirement of W.S.A. 70.11(27), exempting manufacturing machinery and
equipment from property tax, that manufacturing machinery and specific processing equipment be exclusively used in manufacturing tangible personal property.
12. Taxation e=>237
Phrase "directly used," used in W.S.A.
70.11(27), exempting manufacturing machinery and equipment from property tax,
must be defined without resort to hypertechnicality.
13. Taxation <&=»237
Degree of passivity in a structure, e.g.,
motionless character of its walls, is not an
absolute bar to the structure functioning
directly as a machine and, thus, being exempt from property tax under W.S.A. 70.11(27); thus, chemical action within a structure may be as legitimate, for such exemption purposes, as mechanical action.
14. Taxation «=»237
Overliteral approach is not to be used
in resolving issue as to whether a structure
constitutes a building or building component, or whether structure constitutes machinery/equipment exclusively and directly
used in manufacture of property and, thus,
exempt from property tax under W.S.A.
70.11(27).
373 NW 2d—16

15. Taxation <s=>237
Barley bins, in which barley kernels
were "rested" or maintained at controlled
temperatures and humidity to prevent premature germination, were directly and exclusively used in process of brewing beer
to foster an organic process and not merely
to store grain and, thus, were exempt from
property tax as processing "equipment"
under W.S.A. 70.11(27).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

16. Taxation <s=>237
Fact that some human activity, incidental to a structure's function, is carried on
within the structure does not mean that the
structure provides general working space
so as to preclude exemption from property
tax as manufacturing machinery or equipment under W.S.A. 70.11(27).
17. Taxation <3=>237
Working space provided in malt house
was merely incidental to principal function
or use of malt house as an artificial environment conducive to transformation of
barley into malt for the production of beer
and, thus, did not preclude exemption of
malt house from property tax as processing
"equipment" under W.S.A. 70.11(27), where
employee activity in malt house was generally confined to machinery hall, due to fact
that kiln in malt house was too hot and
germinating room was too humid.
18. Taxation <s=>237
Malt house was not merely a shelter
for equipment or storage place for grain
but, instead, was a significant factor in the
production of beer and, thus, was exempt
from property tax as processing "equipment" under W.S.A. 70.11(27), where walls,
floors, and roof of malt house were integral to its function insofar as they kept in
attemperated air, and principal and primary
function of germinating room portion of
malt house was to create artificial environment conducive to transformation of barley
into malt.
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19. Taxation <®=»237
If major portion of structure is conceded to be machinery or equipment used
exclusively and directly in manufacturing,
portion of that structure containing equipment incidental to that structure's function
is also exempt from property tax under
W.S.A. 70.11(27), exempting manufacturing
machinery or equipment from property tax.
20. Taxation <3=*237
Head house, which sat atop malt bins
and was 56-foot tall structure of poured
concrete whose sole purpose was to support cleaning and transferring equipment
through which malt had passed on its journey from malt house into malt bins and
from those bins to brew house, was incidental portion of malt bins, which were exempt
from property tax under W,S.A, 70.11(27)
as machinery or equipment exclusively and
directly used in the production of beer, so
that head house itself was also exempt
from property tax under that statute.
21. Taxation <s=>237
Cellars were not mere shelter, storage,
or working space but, instead, were "machinery" that primarily, directly, and significantly contributed to the processing of
wort into beer and, thus, were exempt from
property tax under W.S.A. 70.11(27), where
cellars* purpose was to support and envelop
tanks of wort-yeast mixture in chilled,
temperature-controlled environment essential for fermentation and aging of beer, and
cellars were all in effect huge walk-in refrigerators and were designed and used for
no purpose other than fermentation and
aging of beer.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
22. Taxation <s=>543(9)
Issue as to whether brewing company
was not entitled to refund of property taxes, due to its failure to pay any of the
disputed property taxes involuntarily or under protest, was not raised at trial and,
thus, was waived on appeal.

23. Taxation <3=»251
Trial court's declaration as to tax status of disputed property for years subsequent to years in issue at trial was improper, since record could contain no evidence
to support the judgment. W.S.A. 70.11(27).
24. Taxation <£=>237
Tax exemption under W.S.A. 70.11(27)
for manufacturing machinery is based on
property use, which must be determined
yearly.
Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., Madison (John C. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Madison, of counsel), for defendant-appellant Wis. Dept. of Revenue.
Grant F. Langley, City Atty., Milwaukee
(Patrick B. McDonnell, Milton Emmerson,
and Scott G. Thomas, Asst. City Attys.,
Milwaukee, of counsel), for defendant and
co-appellant City of Milwaukee.
Michael, Best & Friedrich, Milwaukee
(Rickard T. O'Neil, Jerome H. Kringel, and
John C. Lapinski, Milwaukee, of counsel),
for plaintiff-respondent
Before WEDEMEYER, PJ., and MOSEE
and SULLIVAN, JJ.
SULLIVAN, Judge.
The City of Milwaukee (City) and the
Wisconsin Department of Revenue (Depart
ment) appeal from a judgment determining
that certain structures owned by Pabsl
Brewing Company (Pabst) and used in th<
brewing process were exempt from taxa
tion because they were machinery or equip
ment, and not buildings or building compo
nents, within the meaning of sec. 70.11(27)
Stats. We affirm the trial court's determi
nation that the structures are exempt anc
that Pabst is entitled to a refund of the
taxes paid between 1974 and 1980. How
ever, we reverse that portion of the judg
ment extending Pabst's entitlement to i
tax refund to years beyond those stipulatec
by the parties as being in issue. We do noi
reach the issue whether Pabst paid th<
subject taxes under protest; that issue wai
waived for failure to raise it at trial
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After execution of an extensive stipulation of facts, this case was tried to the
court for one and one-half days in 1980.
The trial was followed by the filing of
extensive post-trial briefs. The trial court
issued its findings of fact and conclusions
of law in September of 1983. Stated briefly, the court determined that each disputed
structure functioned as machinery in the
production of beer and was thus exempt
from property taxation under sec. 70.11(27), Stats. The court also concluded
that Pabst was entitled to a refund of
general property taxes paid with respect to
the misclassified structures. In August of
1984 the court ordered that the order for
judgment must include an order for refund
of taxes paid, not only between 1973 and
1980, but also in 1981, 1982, and 1983. The
order for judgment and judgment were entered on September 4, 1984. This appeal
followed.
It was stipulated by the parties that the
demands of quality control in brewing and
modern mass production "have led to the
design and construction of specialized
structures which are in every sense of the
term 'custom-built' with particular beermaking functions in mind." The chief legal
issue presented is whether certain of these
structures are "buildings or building components" and not exclusively or directly
used in the manufacture of beer, as the
Department and City contend, or are, by
their function in the beer-making process,
not buildings but beer processing equipment exclusively and directly used in manufacturing beer, as Pabst contends and as
the trial court held. This issue was briefed
by the Department, with the City joining in
its arguments. The City briefed the issues
whether Pabst's failure to introduce evidence that it paid under protest bars its
recovery and whether the trial court erred
in ordering the refund of property taxes
paid after 1980.
Four of the structures at issue here are
associated with the malting process, and
four are associated with the fermenting
process. The structures at issue that are
associated with malting are the barley bins
(structures 36 and 24), the malt house

(structure 25), and the head house portion
of the malt bins (structure 16A). The
structures associated with the fermenting
process are cellars 1, 3, 5 and 6. All of the
structures involved in the lawsuit are part
of Pabst's manufacturing plant. Not involved in this case are Pabst's brew house
(which is also part of its manufacturing
plant), its offices and warehouse, and certain of its cellars that the Department conceded were exempt.
The malt bin portion of structure 16A is
conceded to be exempt from property tax
by virtue of this court's ruling on equivalent malt bins in Ladish Malting Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 98 Wis.2d 496,
297 N.W.2d 56 (Ct.App.1980). However,
the head house portion of the structure,
which sits atop the malt bins, is in issue
here. The Department also concedes exemption under Ladish for Pabst's kiln, except for one wall that adjoins the malt
house.
The structures in controversy function in
the brewing process in the following manner. During the malting stage, the barley
is cleaned and graded and then "rested,"
first in structure 36 and then in structure
24. "Resting" is a stage in which, under
controlled temperature and humidity, the
barley undergoes an organic change. The
barley is next transferred to the malt
house, structure 25. There, the barley is
steeped in water and then placed in large
germination compartments, where warm,
moist air is directed over and through the
barley. In this environment the barley germinates. At a prescribed phase in the germination, the barley is transferred to the
kiln, which adjoins the malt house. The
kiln generates a flow of hot, dry air over
the barley, which is now called green malt.
The flow of air dries the malt and halts
germination. After kilning, the malt returns to structure 24, where it is cooled;
and then it passes into the malt bins, structure 16A, for aging and blending. From
the malt bins, the aged and blended malt is
sent to the brew house, a structure not
involved in this case. There, the malt undergoes a process called "mashing" which
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transforms it into a sweet liquor called
"wort." The wort is then piped into tanks
in the cellars, which are like giant refrigerators, where fermenting and aging take
place. The end result is beer.
I.
[1-4] The principal question presented
for review is whether the trial court correctly ruled that Pabst's grain bins, malt
house, the head house portion of its malt
bin, and certain cellars not conceded by the
Department to be exempt were exempt
from property tax under sec. 70.11(27),
Stats, because they were not buildings or
building components and were exclusively
and directly used in the manufacture of
tangible personal property within the
meaning of sec. 70.11(27). When the question on appeal is whether a statutory concept embraces a particular set of factual
circumstances, the reviewing court is generally presented with a mixed question of
fact and law. See Nottelson v. DILHR, 94
Wis.2d 106, 115-16, 287 N.W.2d 763, 76768 (1980). In this case the parties stipulated to the essential facts, i.e., the various
roles of the structures in the brewing process. Thus, we are faced only with the
ultimate question of whether the facts, in
the case of each structure, fulfill the statutory standards that would exempt the
structures from property taxation. This is
a question of law. See Department of
Revenue v. Bailey-Bokrman Steel Corp.,
93 Wis.2d 602, 606, 287 N.W.2d 715, 717
(1980). On questions of law, we do not
defer to the trial court. Id. Where an
administrative agency's expertise is significant to the determination, we will accord
some weight to its decision, but it is not
controlling. Nottelson, 94 Wis.2d at 117,
287 N.W.2d at 768.
Section 70.11(27), Stats., exempts from
property taxation "[manufacturing machinery and specific processing equipment,
exclusively and directly used by a manufacturer in manufacturing tangible personal
property." The section defines manufacturing machinery and specific processing
equipment as

any combination of electrical, mechanical
or chemical means, including special
foundations therefor, designed to work
together in the transformation of materials or substances into new articles or
components, including parts therefor, regardless of ownership and regardless of
attachment to real property. This shall
not be construed to include materials,
supplies, buildings or building components
(Emphasis added).
This section has been in effect since the
1974 tax assessment. See ch. 90, Laws of
1973.
[5-7] A tax exemption statute is to be
strictly construed against granting the exemption, and the burden of bringing the
property in question within the terms of
the exemption is on the taxpayer. Ladish,
98 Wis.2d at 502, 297 N.W.2d at 58. An
exemption statute need not be given the
narrowest possible construction. "A strict
but reasonable construction seems to be
the pithy and popular statement of the
rule." Id. (citations omitted).
In enacting sec. 70.11(27), Stats., the
"legislature plainly intended to exempt
manufacturing machinery and equipment
exclusively used in transforming raw products into merchantable goods, while withholding the exemption from buildings and
building components." Ladish, 98 Wis.2d
at 503, 297 N.W.2d at 58. Thus, we are
primarily concerned with two concepts contained in sec. 70.11(27). We are concerned
with whether the disputed property is
"manufacturing machinery" "exclusively
and directly" used in manufacturing tangible personal property and with whether the
disputed property is a "building" or "building component."
In making these determinations we follow the "function or use" test adopted by
this court in Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 506-11,
297 N.W.2d at 60-62, and by the supreme
court in Department of Revenue v. Greeting, 112 Wis.2d 602, 607, 334 N.W.2d 118,
121 (1983). In Ladish we held that Ladish
Malting Company's attemperators, kilns
and malt elevators were exempt from taxation under sec. 70.11(27), Stats., despite the
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fact that all of the structures had "walls,
floors, and ceilings or roofs" and had a
" 'building-like' appearance from the outside." See 98 Wis.2d at 499, 297 N.W.2d at
57. We rejected the "physical appearance"
test in favor of a functional analysis under
which the central question is whether the
structure is one " 'whose utility is principally and primarily a significantly contributive
factor in the actual manufacture or production of the product itself.' " Id. at 506, 297
N.W.2d at 60 (citation omitted). We concluded that each disputed structure was
"designed [and used] to process raw materials into a final product, and for no other
purpose." Id. at 510, 297 N.W.2d at 62.
Citing Ladish, the supreme court in
Greiling adopted the "use or function"
test. In Greiling the issue was whether a
greenhouse was a "machine" exempt from
the use tax under sec. 77.54(3), Stats. The
supreme court decided that the functional
characteristics of a greenhouse made it a
machine for purposes of the use tax exemption: "(This greenhouse] cannot be viewed
merely as a storage facility because it has
an active function of creating and controlling an environment conducive to the production of floricultural crops. . . . On this
record, it has no other purpose or function,
nor could it be successfully adapted to another use." 112 Wis.2d at 607, 334 N.W.2d
at 121.
[8] Greiling and Ladish make it clear
that a structure's external appearance does
not determine whether it is a building.
Rather, the question is whether the structure is being used as a building in the
taxpayer's hands. Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at
506, 297 N.W.2d at 60 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499
F.2d 1263, 1271, 205 CtCl. 402 (1974)). An
emphasis on function elevates substance
over form. Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 510, 297
N.W.2d at 62.
The question whether a structure is a
building arises frequently under federal
tax law in relation to the investment credit
section of the Internal Revenue Code,
which employs the phrase, "building and its
structural components." See I.R.C. sec.

48(a)(1)(B). We note that when sec. 70.11(27), Stats., was drafted, representatives
of industry asked the legislature to substitute the more restrictive phrase "buildings
or building components" for the originally
drafted phrase "structures or fixtures" in
order to obtain greater conformity with
I.R.C. sec. 48(a)(1)(B) and the body of case
law that had developed around it. See
Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 504-05, 297 N.W.2d at
59. The federal regulations define "building" as "any structure or edifice enclosing
a space within its walls, and usually covered by a roof, the purpose of which is, for
example, to provide shelter or housing, or
to provide working, office, parking, display,
or sales space." 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.48-l(e)(l)
(1984). The term does not include "a structure which is essentially an item of machinery or equipment" and "does not include
such structures as oil and gas storage
tanks, grain storage bins, silos, fractionating towers, blast furnaces, basic oxygen
furnaces, coke ovens, brick kilns, and coal
tipples." Id.
A similar definition, referred to in Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 509, 297 N.W.2d at 61,
was that of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v.
Township of Woodbridge, 73 N.J. 474, 375
A.2d 1165, 1167 (1977): "A building in the
usual and ordinary acceptation of the word
is a structure designed and suitable for
habitation or sheltering human beings and
animals, sheltering or storing property, or
for use and occupation for trade or manufacture."
[9] Thus, in asking whether a structure
functions as a building in the taxpayer's
hands, we must first ask whether the structure was designed, and is principally employed, to provide shelter or housing to
humans or animals; storage for property;
or working, office, parking, sales, or display space for trade or industry. The Department would have us conclude, under
the instant facts, that the structures at
issue house people and machines and provide industrial working space and, thus, are
buildings. The Department also urges
that, whatever label one affixes to the
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structures, they are not "exclusively and
directly used in the manufacture of tangible personal property."
[10,11] The phrase "exclusively used"
is defined for tax exemption purposes in
Black's Law Dictionary 507 (5th ed. 1979)
as "[having] reference to primary and inherent [use] as over against a mere secondary and incidental use." While neither
Ladish nor Greiling defines "exclusive and
direct use," their adoption of the function
or use test implies that "exclusively" does
not have to mean "solely" or "purely" but
rather "principally and primarily." Under
the function or use test, the question asked
is whether the structure's utility is "principally and primarily" a significant contributing factor in the product's manufacture.
Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 506, 297 N.W.2d at 60.
Incidential use of manufacturing property
for a nonexempt purpose does not violate
the exclusivity requirement of sec. 70.11(27), Stats. Manitowoc Co. v. City of
Sturgeon Bay, 122 Wis.2d 406, 414, 362
N.W.2d 432, 437 (Ct.App.1984).
[12,13] Similarly, the phrase "directly
used" must be defined without resort to
hypertechnicality. A degree of passivity in
a structure, e.g., the motionless character
of its walls, is not an absolute bar to its
functioning directly as a machine. Chemical action within a structure may be as
legitimate, for these purposes, as mechanical action. See Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 50708, 297 N.W.2d at 61.
[14] Thus, we do not deem it inconsistent with the rule of strict construction to
reject an over-literal approach to the question whether a structure constitutes a
building or building component or machinery/equipment exclusively and directly
used in the manufacture of property. See
Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. v.
County of Sonoma, 44 Cal.App.3d 23, 118
Cal.Rptr. 422, 425 (1974) (phrase "exclusively used," in context of property tax
exemption for property exclusively used
for public schools, construed to allow incidental other uses necessary to and in furtherance of primary use). Our supreme

court has avoided hypertechnical applies
tions of property tax exemption statutes.
See, e.g., Family Hospital Nursing Home
v. City of Milwaukee, 78 Wis.2d 312, 32023, 254 N.W.2d 268, 273-75 (1977) (phras*
"used exclusively," in context of tax ex*
emption for property used exclusively foj
benevolent purposes, construed to allow benevolent association to charge fees to nursing home patients, to reimburse directors
for expenses, and to claim exemption for
post-construction period when nursing
home was being readied for patient occupancy). We now turn to an analysis at
each structure at issue.
THE BARLEY BINS
[15] The barley bins in structures 38
and 24 are separate physical entities M
historical reasons not germane to this cas$
the two barley bins perform a common
function in the beer making process. Bog[
bins "rest" or maintain the barley kernel
at controlled temperatures and humidity to
prevent premature germination. Properly
timed and uniform germination is essential
to large scale malting, and this uniform
germination could not take place without
resting the barley. Contrary to the Department's assertion, the function of the
barley bins is not the passive storage of
barley kernels. The barley actually undergoes an organic change when it rests, and
the parties so stipulated:
For reasons which have not been scientifically pinpointed, freshly harvested,
"country-run" barley goes through a period of "dormancy" following harvesting,
during which time individual barley kernels will germinate at uneven, non-uniform rates or not at all. The period of
dormancy varies for different barley
strains, but is generally around six
weeks. Since large scale malting requires even, uniform barley germination,
the barley must be permitted to "rest"
until the dormancy period "breaks" in
order to reach good germinating energy
and capacity for malting.
It appears to us to be beyond controversy
that the use of the barley bins "is commit-
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ted to a more ambitious purpose' than
mere storage See Ladish, 98 Wis 2d at
503, 297 N W 2d at 59
Pabst cites a federal court case concerning the tax status, for investment credit
purposes, of tobacco sheds used to age
tobacco In Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp v United States, 369 F Supp 1283
(W D Ky 1973), affd per curiam, 491 F 2d
1258 (6th Cir 1974), the district court noted
that the aging process was an essential and
integral part of the manufacture of tobacco
products and that the sheds in issue were
specially designed and built for fostering
this organic process Id, 369 FSupp at
1285 The court concluded that the sheds
were not "buildings," but storage facilities
entitled to the investment credit Id at
1288
Insofar as the barley bins perform an
integral function m the production of malt,
we must conclude that they are "directly
used" in the brewing process They are
also "exclusively" so used since their use is
devoted entirely to maintaining proper
temperature and humidity ranges under
different weather conditions for the resting
of barley The bins are used for no other
purpose The bins were designed and constructed to foster an organic process and
not merely to store gram As such, they
do not function as buildings but, rather, as
processing equipment Just as in Gretling,
these structures create "the artificial environment necessary to produce" a product
and, as such, can be considered machines
112 Wis 2d at 606, 334 NW2d at 120
We conclude that the principal utility of
Pabst's barley bins is a significant factor m
the production of beer We thus hold that
the bins are exempt from property tax under sec 70 11(27), Stats
THE MALT HOUSE
The malt house, structure 25, has two
mam parts, the germinating room and the
malt kiln The Department concedes exemption for three of the four kiln walls
The Department acknowledges, with the
exception of the fourth wall, that the kiln is
equivalent to the kiln held tax-exempt in

Ladish The Department's refusal to exempt the fourth wall of the kiln rests on its
refusal to exempt the malt house as a
whole It contends that the remainder of
the malt house (the germinating room) is a
building or building component
The function of the malt house is to
convert barley into malt on a large scale
The house has six stones, multiple rooms,
stairs, an elevator, and office space The
principal parts of the germinating room
portion of the malt house are the steep
tank area, the germination compartment
area, and the spray deck The germinating
room's steep tanks are filled with heated,
aerated water into which barley is submerged to begin the germination process.
The barley is conveyed to germination compartments after it has been steeped The
compartments are large vats or troughs in
which the temperature, moisture, and carbon dioxide content are controlled The
steep tanks and germination compartments
are themselves exempt from taxation
A complex air circulation and attemperation system is built into the malt house.
Through a network of air shafts, fresh air
is directed m and through the gram beds,
and foul air out, in such a way as to
achieve the transformation of the barley
into green malt The very walls, floors,
and roof of the structure are part of the
network of fresh and foul air shafts The
process of attemperatmg the fresh air
starts in the "spray deck" on the top floor
of the malt house, where outside air is
conditioned and humidified From there,
the air is sent through openings to flow
into the grain compartments throughout
the malt house Twenty four-hour monitoring of the temperature levels in each
germination compartment is maintained by
Pabst employees who make the necessary
air flow adjustments to keep the temperature within a specific range
The Department stipulated before trial
that the spray deck was a giant air conditioner-humidifier, the Department asserts,
however, that the malt house as a whole is
not principally or primarily a giant air conditioner-humidifier, as were the attempera-
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tors in Ladish See 98 Wis 2d at 499-500,
297 N Vtf 2d at 57 The Department con
tends that the malt house is no different
from any ordinary industrial building containing an air circulation system to get rid
of smoke, dust or smells generated by the
manufacturing activities carried on within
The malt house, argues the Department, is
simply housing for the machinery, equipment, and employees who facilitate the con
version of barley into malt
We are persuaded otherwise Again, under a functional analysis, we cannot say
that the malt house was designed, and is
principally employed, merely to provide
shelter for equipment, storage for gram,
and working space for employees
[16,17] We first reject the notion that
the malt house is a shelter for employees to
work Granted, there are control room areas where employees monitor equipment
function, and there is an office for the
supervisor of malt house employees However, it appears that the employee activity
in the malt house for purposes of temperature monitoring, operation, and maintenance is no different m type or degree
from that considered incidental in Ladi$h
See id at 501, 297 N W 2d at 58 Employ
ee activity in the malt house is generally
confined to the machinery hall, which contains levers for operating the kiln floors,
monitoring and other equipment for the
germinating room and kiln, the supervisor's office, the elevator, and the stairwell
The elevator and stairwell provide access to
the different levels to check the machinery
Outside of the machinery hall, there is little
employee involvement in the malt house,
the kiln is too hot and the germinating
room too humid The germinating room is
monitored on an almost totally automated
basis Indeed, as m Lad\&h> human entry
may be gained only through an airlock, due
to vast differences in air pressure See id
The fact that some human activity incidental to a structure's function, is carried on
within the structure, does not mean that
the structure provides general working
space See Brown & Williamson Tobacco,
369 F Supp at 1288 We conclude that the

working space provided in the malt house
is merely incidental to its principal function
or use See Ladish, 98 Wis 2d at 506, 297
N W 2d at 60
[18] We likewise reject the assertion
that the malt house is merely a shelter for
equipment or a storage place for grain.
The gram undergoes an organic transformation in the malt house, just as in the
barley bins Pabst presented uncontradicted expert testimony to the effect that each
area of the malt house is the large scale
functional equivalent of small-scale machinery counterparts m Pabst's small pilot
plant The walls, floors, and roof of the
malt house are integral to its function insofar as they keep in the attemperated air
The principal and primary function of the
germinating room portion of the malt
house is to create an artificial environment
conducive to the transformation of barley
the greenhouse in Grexling See 112
Wis 2d at 606-07, 334 N W 2d at 120-21.
The Department contends that exempt
ing the Pabst malt house would invalidate
the "buildings or building components" exception to the exemption provided in sec
70 11(27), Stats, by placing "untold numbers" of custom-built factory buildings
"completely beyond taxation" We can
only determine whether the structures in
the case before us are exempt under the
statute as it is written This court does not
make tax policy
We conclude that the entire malt house
functions as machinery or equipment because its principal utility is a significant
factor m the production of beer Accordingly, we hold that the entire malt house \s
exempt from taxation under sec 70 11(27),
Stats
THE HEAD HOUSE
The head house, which sits atop the malt
bins, structure 16A, was described in the
Stipulation of Facts as a "56-feet tall structure
of poured concrete" whose *sol«
purpose
is to support cleaning and
transferring equipment through which the

PABST BREWING CO. v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE

Wis.

689

Cite M 373 N.W^d 680 (Wis.App. 1985)

malt must pass on its journey from the
Malt House into the bins and from the bins
to the Brew House." Although the Department is now exempting all of the malt
bin portion of structure 16A, it argues that
the head house portion of the structure
may not be exempted because it is a building. The Department asserts that the head
house encloses and protects cleaning and
conveying equipment from the elements
and, as such, is merely a shelter for property.
According to the Stipulation of Facts,
structure 16A was designed and is used "to
protect the malt from moisture and extreme variations of temperature and humidity and to age and blend the malt on a
large scale." To get to the malt bins for
aging and blending, the malt must be conveyed from the malt house. After aging
and blending, the malt must be conveyed
from the malt bins to the brew house for
mashing. The cleaning and transferring
equipment that takes the malt in and out of
the malt bins is contained in the head
house. The cleaning and transferring
equipment is itself exempt.
[19,20] It is undisputed that the head
house is a "part" of structure 16A and that
structure 16A, except for the head house,
is exempt from taxation under Ladish,
which held that malt elevators (equivalent
to the instant malt bins) were exempt. If
the major portion of structure 16A is conceded to be machinery or equipment used
exclusively and directly in manufacturing,
we must conclude that the portion of the
structure containing equipment incidental
to that structure's function is also exempt.
Hence, we hold that structure 16A, in its
entirety, is exempt from taxation because it
is machinery or equipment exclusively and
directly used in the production of beer.
THE CELLARS
After leaving the malt bins (structure
16A), the aged and blended malt goes to
the brew house for mashing. There, it
becomes a sweet liquor called wort. From
the brew house the wort is piped to tanks
in cellars for fermentation and aging. The

Department argues that cellars 1, 3, 5, and
6 do not themselves perform a manufacturing function but rather create a workplace
for persons to operate already-exempted
equipment to make beer. Pabst responds
that the cellars function as refrigerators
and, thus, as machines.
The parties stipulated that fermentation
is a carefully temperature-controlled process consisting of two stages. In the first,
or primary, stage the wort is combined
with yeast and subjected to a temperature
of 50°—57°F for seven to nine days. Under these conditions, the yeast converts the
sugar in the wort into alcohol and carbon
dioxide. In the second stage of fermentation, the beer is transferred to other tanks
for separation of most of the yeast from
the wort and subjection to a temperature of
32°F. The yeast cells remaining in the
wort become lethargic at that temperature,
and fermentation continues at a substantially diminished rate for several weeks.
As the wort gains in alcohol and carbon
dioxide, it develops the taste found in commercial beer.
In earlier times, wort could be fermented
and aged only during cool periods of the
year or in deep subterranean cellars. Modern-day cellars are giant, above-ground
structures that permit fermentation to take
place the year round.
[21] The cellars vary somewhat in construction, but all serve the same purpose.
The parties stipulated that the cellars' purpose is "to support and envelop the tanks
of the wort-yeast mixture in the chilled,
temperature controlled environment essential for fermentation and aging." The parties also stipulated that the "cellars are all
in effect huge walk-in refrigerators and
were designed and are used for no purpose
other than fermentation and aging of
beer."
Cellar 5, the oldest cellar, is essentially a
huge block of poured concrete in which an
array of hollow chambers was formed as
the concrete was being poured. The resulting structure resembles a honey comb.

690

Wis.

373 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES

The parties stipulated to the following description:
[S]ome of the chambers are shaped and
used to hold fermenting wort. The tops,
bottoms, and sides of these fermenting
chambers consist of the very same concrete of which the structure of cellar 5
itself is made. Other chambers run
above, below and in between the fermenting chambers and form an interconnected network of ducts through which
refrigerated air is circulated to cool the
fermenting wort. The walls of the ducts
themselves are the opposite face of the
walls of the fermenting chambers.
Thus, the ducts themselves, like the fermenting chambers, are formed of the
very concrete of which Cellar 5 is made.
The stipulation goes on to state that
"[t]here is absolutely no purpose for which
Cellar 5 could be used, other than the fermentation or aging of beer, without substantial alterations and improvements."
Cellars 1, 3, and 6 are constructed differently. They all have an interconnected network of columns and beams forming a gallery of horizontally spaced and vertically
stacked cubicles with a single fermentation
tank occupying each cubicle. Each tank
rests on supports affixed directly to the
beams and fully occupies a complete bay
area or cubicle. The weight of each tank is
entirely supported by the horizontal beam
on which it rests. The beam is then connected to the column nearest the tank.
The parties stipulated that "[cjellars 1, 3
and 6 are custom designed for and used
only for the process of fermenting and
aging beer" and that "[b]ecause of their
custom designed nature, they could be converted to another use only at great expense
and only after making substantial changes
to the existing structural arrangement."
The Department's concessions that the
cellars could be used for no other purpose
than fermentation and aging of beer without substantial alterations and improvements is in flat contradiction to its assertion that the cellars' sole purpose is to
create employee work areas. The record
indicates that the presence of employees in

the cellars is occasional and is limited mainly to connecting or disconnecting hoses and
taking wort samples and temperatures.
Except for narrow drainage aisles, there is
very little space for employees even to
walk. Further, the temperatures are too
low, and the air too damp, for regular
human occupation. Again, this employee
activity is comparable in type and degree to
that considered incidental in Ladish, 98
Wis.2d at 501, 297 N.W.2d at 58.
In Brown-Forman, 499 F.2d at 1268-73,
certain large whiskey aging structures
were held not to be building components
excluded from qualifying for the investment tax credit despite the fact that employees regularly entered them to load and
unload barrels, search for and repair leaks,
and check for temperatures and humidity.
A case even more closely analogous to the
one before us is Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. 1351 (1968). At issue
in Coors were cellars virtually identical to
the Pabst cellars; they were described as
shells with steel supports to enclose and
support very large beer tanks and related
equipment. Id. at 1357. Employees entered the cellars to check temperatures,
pressures, and cooling systems; take beer
samples; and fill, empty, and clean the
tanks. The court ruled that the cellars
were not buildings for purposes of the investment tax credit Id. at 1358.
The Department also argues that the cellars do no more than shelter the large
tanks within and that, thus, they do not
directly transform a substance into tangible personal property. The framing and
walls of the cellars, it is true, play a passive role in the fermentation process, but
so do the walls and framing of any refrigerator. The cellar walls hold in the air that
cools the tanks and permits fermentation
and aging; the cellar framing holds the
tanks in place. In Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Wanamaker, 286 A.D. 446, 144
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1955), affd, 2 N.Y 2d 764,
157 N.Y.S.2d 972, 139 N.E.2d 150 (1956), in
the context of a sales and use tax exemption for property directly and exclusively
used in the production of tangible personal
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property, the court said: "[Activity is not
the test of directness, The walls of the
boiler have a 'passive' function in one
sense. The important thing is that all
parts of the plant contribute, continuously
and vitally, to production, and they are all
integrated and harmonized." Id., 144 N.Y.
S.2d at 462. The passive nature of the
cellar walls and framing must not be allowed to obscure the fact that their sole
reason for existence is to create the conditions that permit the fermentation of beer
on a mass-production scale.
We conclude that cellars 1, 3, 5, and 6 are
used principally and directly to process
wort into beer; thus, they function as machines. The cellars were not designed, and
are not primarily used, to provide mere
shelter, storage, or working space; thus,
they are not buildings or building components. Because the cellars are machinery
that primarily, directly, and significantly
contributes to the manufacture of tangible
personal property, they are exempt from
property taxation under sec. 70.11(27),
Stats.
II.
We now turn to the issues surrounding
Pabst's entitlement to a refund of property
taxes paid on the disputed structures. We
first dispose of the City's charge that
Pabst is entitled to no refund because it
failed to prove that it had paid any of the
taxes on the disputed property involuntarily or under protest.
The City did not raise the issue whether
Pabst paid under protest at any time in the
proceedings before the trial court. The
issue was neither raised in pretrial briefs,
nor during the trial, nor in post-trial briefs.
The parties stipulated that the issues to be
decided by the trial court were whether the
structures were buildings or building components and whether the property was exclusively and directly used in manufacturing.
The trial court noted in its findings of
fact and conclusions of law that "none of
the major defenses raised in Heilman [sic]
Brewing Co. v. City of LaCrosse, 105

Wis.2d 152, 312 N.W.2d 875 [Ct.App.1981],
was raised in this action and are accordingly not here present." The defenses in
Heileman to which the trial court alluded
included payment under protest. See id. at
155, 312 N.W.2d at 876.
[22] As a general rule, an appellate
court will not consider issues raised for the
first time on appeal. County of Columbia
v. Bylewski, 94 Wis.2d 153, 171, 288
N.W.2d 129, 138-39 (1980). As it appears
tha^t the payment under protest question
was not considered a genuine issue until
after the City lost the case, we deem the
issue waived.
Both the City and the Department complain on appeal that the trial court erred in
including in its judgment the years 1981,
1982, and 1983. The parties stipulated that
the only years to be covered by the judgment were 1974 through 1980. The Department briefs the issue whether Pabst
was entitled to a declaratory judgment on
the tax status of the subject property for
years after 1980, and the City briefs the
issue whether Pabst was entitled to a judgment ordering a refund for years after
1980. The Department is not a defendant
in Pabst's claim for a refund.
This case dates back to 1975 when Pabst
filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment on the tax status of certain structures for the year 1974. The complaint
was amended and expanded in 1976 to seek
relief for 1974 and subsequent years. The
parties subsequently entered into several
stipulations that included agreements on
the years to be covered by the judgment
sought. The last of these stipulations was
entered into in February, 1980, immediately
prior to an evidentiary hearing. This final
stipulation provided that the years to be
covered by the declaratory judgment were
1974 through 1980. In the final judgment
entered in 1984 (four years after trial), the
court ruled that the judgment also included
the years 1981 through 1983.
[23,24] The trial court's declaration as
to the tax status of the disputed property
for years subsequent to the years in issue
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at trial was improper because "the record
could contain no evidence to support" the
judgment. See Family Hospital Nursing
Home, 78 Wis.2d at 327, 254 N.W.2d at
276. The tax exemption for manufacturing
machinery is based on property use, which
must be determined yearly. Manitowoc
Co., 122 Wis.2d at 413, 362 N.W.2d at 436.
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of
the judgment extending the court's ruling

to the years 1981, 1982, and 1983. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment and order affirmed in part and
reversed in part.

